THE late 1930S saw a definite turn in political de Following the abandonment of Civil Disobedience period of internal peace helped the Congress, until movement with a general commitment to fight forei more organized party capable of aspiring to politica process, its relations with different social forces to shape. While in the past the Congress had clung to th society free of internal conflicts and united in oppo the growth of social conflicts in town and country into account the competing aspirations of various g Assuming office in seven provinces in July I937 qualified provincial autonomy introduced by the 19 party found itself confronted with the difficult tas these competing interests within a framework in financial resources were available; financial contr remained firmly in British hands,1 and provinces h sources of revenue. Among the interest groups w demands on the Congress ministries the most powe business class, which had expanded at a relatively qu period 1932-37, and which found itself increasingly conservative economic policies followed by the Gove the 'Indian business class' we mean here Indian big b small elite of big traders, financiers and industrialis concentrated in a few centres like Bombay, Ah Cawnpore and Coimbatore. Though far from co geneous group, these businessmen displayed cer which set them clearly apart from the mass of sma I am grateful to Dr Sumit Sarkar for his comments on an earli The remaining errors of judgement are of course mine.
lenders, brokers and petty entrepreneurs which for Indian merchant classes. They differed from the le size of their financial resources, the range and scal (from foreign trade to big industry), and their orga had captured the leadership of most of the regiona and had established in 1927 the first all-India busin Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and In the closest thing to a lobby in India. This group ha of funds for the Congress campaigns since the 192os some influence on the Congress High Command. W expected to derive some advantages from the adv ministries, they were at the same time apprehensiv latter would follow in labour matters.
How could the Congress accommodate capitalist demands along with the growing populist pressures and postures which were in evidenc both outside and inside the Party? Conversely, would businessmen, who had always been careful of keeping good relations with the British, and had used nationalist agitations mainly as a means of extracting concessions from them, adjust to a situation in which some power o patronage had passed from the hands of the British into those of the Congress? These were some of the questions raised by the advent of the Congress ministries. After I937 the British, though they were less in evidence, had not altogether disappeared from the Indian scene and therefore the political attitudes of the Indian businessmen during the 1937-39 period were determined by a complex interplay of national and provincial factors. Though this study will focus on the relations between Indian business and the Congress in the major Congress-ruled provinces (thus leaving aside Bengal and its strong Marwari business community) the impact of all-India trends will not be ignored.
Relations between Congress and Business before the Advent of the Congress Ministries
Relations between Congress and business at the national level had grown closer during the I92os and the first phase of the Civil Disobedience movement (1930-31), but were severely strained in . During these years, business support for the movement remained limited, while the Indian business class split over the issue of imperial preference and the Ottawa agreement. Though the small and medium-scale traders in Bombay embarked upon an effective boycott of Indian capitalists persisted even after the abandonment of Ci Disobedience by the Congress, but they became less pronounced Bombay business grew aware of the new moderation of the Congr leadership and found it increasingly difficult to conciliate its interes with those of Lancashire.2 In 1936 common opposition to the Congres left drew both factions of big business closer to the dominant group of the
Congress leadership.3
The decision by the Congress High Command to contest the I9 elections in the provinces under the new regime of provincial autono showed that the Congress was ready to accept at least partly the n constitution. It exposed the basic weakness of its left wing, which ha been preaching boycott of the elections. Business circles genera welcomed the Congress decision and some financial aid was promised the Party. 4 However, since the elections were fought on a provincial basis, the attitudes of businessmen were largely dictated by their relations with the Congress organizations at the provincial level, and not only by the rapport they had established with the High Command. The situation, thus, varied considerably from province to province. Prior to I937, under the so-called 'dyarchy' regime, non-Congress provincial governments had only limited powers, but industry and civil works were among the transferred subjects and had conveyed some powers of patronage. In some provinces, the non-Congres Bombay city, not much money was raised eit Dalmia, the big Marwari industrialist, gave some scale.9
In spite of these difficulties, the Congress scored most of the provinces and showed that, outsid provinces, it was the dominant political forc absolute majority in six of the eleven prov Provinces, Madras, Northwest Frontier Provi United Provinces) was close to it in Bombay, largest party in Assam, and fared badly only in t was the largest centre of the textile industry in the province), the opposition to the Congress from large Indian trading and moneylending interests was demonstrated by the failure of the Congress Party to secure any of the reserved seats. In the Nattukottai Nagarathar Association constituency, the Congress candidate was defeated by Muttiah Chettiar, a merchant prince and a banker, the head of the Nattukottai Chettiar community, which dominated the financial scene in south Madras, the 1937 results will undoubtedly appear as a setback. In the Central Provinces also, the anti-Congress feelings of one section of the traders and industrialists were shown by the defeat of the Congress candidate to the Berar commerce seat (which included Nagpur, the only big commercial and industrial centre in the province) at the hands of one of the biggest Marwari millowners of the province. The overall results thus reveal a fair amount of support for the Congress from the electorate in the reserved constituencies (which represented the upper strata of the Indian business community), despite the existence of strong pockets of opposition in two or three provinces.
Other indications about businessmen's participation in the political process are to be found in an analysis of the results of the elections to the non-commercial seats. It was customary for some big businessmen having an interest in politics to seek election from either urban or rural seats. In the I934 elections to the Central Legislative Assembly, some businessmen were elected to such seats,12 generally as independents.
There is no precise data available on the number of businessmen who tried to get elected in the 1937 elections, but one must draw attention to the following facts. Two figures of local big business who contested on non-Congress tickets suffered crushing defeats at the hands of the Congress in two rural constituencies of the Cawnpore district.13 The only representative of big business who was elected as an independent in 12 Among them was Sir CowasjiJehangir, a big Parsi financier and industrialist, who was elected from Bombay Central (Non-Muhammedan Urban). When the Congress ministries were formed in seven provinces, the Indian economy had just started to recover from the effects of the unprecedented depression of the early I930s. The depression resulted in a fall in land revenue, which was the single largest source of revenue for the provincial governments,19 and thus had a disastrous impact on provincial finances. While the Central Government had been able to overcome a financial crisis by I932,20 the provincial governments remained in a difficult situation throughout the thirties. Their inability to find new sources of revenue to supplement those in existence prevented them from making any significant contribution towards economic development. The share of civil works in the total expenditure of all the provincial governments actually fell during the first half of the 1930S, and the allocation for industries (a purely provincial subject since the I9i9 reforms) remained at a measly one per cent.21 In this context, the devolution to the provincial governments of increased responsibilities in matters of economic development and social welfare under the 1935 reforms, was bound to remain purely theoretical, unless accompanied by an increase in the financial resources of the provinces.
A small step in that direction had been made when the Government of allocation had been made between the different p ones, such as the newly-formed provinces of Oris favoured at the expense of the more developed on Bombay, which were deemed to have sufficient r community in the latter provinces had reacted ver Niemeyer Award, protesting that lack of resource work of the ministries.23 Despite these hostile re Award had the merit of offering some prospect of beleaguered governments of the poorest province Another innovation introduced by the I935 r freedom given to the provincial governments to b from the market without having to go through t machinery of the Central Government. Yet borro than an expedient; to attract investors, the provi to offer conditions at least as interesting as those which meant that in the future the repayment o would necessitate a raising of the permanent reve conditions restricted considerably the possibili governments. Unless they managed to cut down n expenditure (which would necessarily mean powerfully-entrenched bureaucracy) or to raise given the inelasticity of land revenue, meant incre never a popular measure), there was not much change in provincial policies. An added cons prohibitionist fad, which threatened to reduce on of provincial revenue.
Financial constraints were not the only factor t Congress relations in the provinces. Labour pro increasing role, due to the rapid growth of lab from the mid-thirties and to the increased politic unions.
India's labour movement, which had grown steadily throughout the 1920S, had suffered a setback at the end of the 192os and during the early I930s, because of repression, internal splits, and the unfavourable impact of the depression on worker's struggles. From 1935 onwards, the movement had started regaining strength. The number of registered unions and their membership showed an upward trend, strikes became more frequent, and the two largest federations of trade-unions initiated a process of gradual rapprochement.24 As the trade union moveme grew in strength, it was able to make its weight felt in politics. T provincial elections in I937 witnessed attempts at an adjustme between the Congress and the trade-unions over the sharing of the seat reserved for labour. While this was not possible everywhere, neverthele the Congress was able to capture approximately half of the seats reserved for labour in the provincial assemblies.25 To get workers' vot in the elections to the general urban seats, the Congress made bi promises to them in its electoral manifesto. This attitude had paid off, shown by the victories of the Congress candidates in most of the tow with a sizable working-class population.26 The advent of Congres ministries in the majority of the provinces no doubt raised grea expectations among workers and prompted them towards a greate militancy. During 1937, the labour scene in India was dominated by th great strike of the Calcutta jute workers, which affected an industry dominated by British capital, and received encouragement from t Congress. The Calcutta strike was a clear warning that labour unre was growing, and there was not much likelihood that the Congress-rule provinces of Bombay, Madras and the United Provinces, which had sizable industrial labour force,27 would be spared. As a matter of fact the new Congress ministry in the United Provinces was immediate confronted with a general strike of the millworkers in Cawnpore.
Capitalists, particularly the large section which had manufacturin interests, were naturally disturbed at the growing incidence of strike and they were aware that Congress propaganda had helped nurtu discontent among the workers. Despite handsome profits made i I936-37,28 they still entertained fears of a recession. Already the suga industry, which had gone through an unprecedented boom in 1932-36 had been affected by an overproduction crisis, mainly due to unregulated competition among mills. Another distressing factor was the new 25 Out of thirty-eight labour seats, the Congress contested twenty and won eighteen.
It won all the labour seats in Madras and the United Provinces, while in Bombay it contested and won only two of the seven reserved seats.
26 The only exception was the Bombay Presidency, where Ambedkar's Independent Labour Party won some of the urban working-class seats.
27 In i937, out of 1,675,869 factory workers in India, the largest number was in Bengal, 566,458, followed by Bombay, 435,207, Madras, 186,630, and the United The new Congress ministries therefore were faced with a difficult task: they had to try to conciliate the interests of two groups which had tended to support them in the elections and which both equally hoped that Congress rule would bring them benefits. The ministries were in danger of being subjected to contradictory pressures from above and from below. The Congress High Command, with which the capitalists wielded more influence than the trade unions, was likely to pressurize them towards taking a stand against labour; while local Congress organizations, more responsive to direct pressure from workers, would advocate support for their demands. The provincial governments would be hard put to find a middle way.
Apart from the problems posed by labour unrest, the Congress ministries would also have to arbitrate between the demands of urban and rural interests. Though conciliation was possible in many cases, as linkages were numerous between urban capitalists and big landlords in the countryside,29 there was nevertheless the possibility that urban and rural interests would increasingly compete for scarce resources. Some capitalists were undoubtedly scared that, buttressed by Gandhi's non-Congress province, and in the Indian States.32 Therefore t could afford to take a long-term view of developments and see the n ministries as one more step towards a peaceful transfer of power at Centre.33 The capitalists who had the bulk of their interests in Congress-ruled provinces, and particularly those in the Bom Presidency, were more closely concerned with the policies of t Congress ministries.
Economic and Social Policies of the Congress Ministries in th
Initial Phase (summer 1937-spring 1938)
The biggest single factor to influence the course of relations betwee Indian business and the newly-formed Congress ministries was labou unrest. The advent of popular ministries encouraged workers in
Congress-ruled provinces to press for the redress of grievances which been accumulating for the last few years. Though most auth emphasize the economic aspects of labour demands in that period there is no doubt that political changes also played a,role in the n upsurge in labour militancy. The election manifesto issued by t trade-unionist and the Labour and Industries Minister of Madra testified in his memoirs to the great expectations raised among work by the advent of the Congress governments.36 In most provinces the ministries were soon confronted with an unprecedented wave of labo disputes; I937 and I938 were peak years in terms of incidence of labo trouble: one has to go back to 1928-29 to find comparable unrest. Wh is also significant is that while in 1937 Bengal was the province m affected by disputes, due to the long strike in th focus of the disturbances tended to shift to the C particularly Madras and the United Provinces. In I937 Bengal accounted for more than two thirds of all man-days lost in India due to industrial disputes, but in 1938 its share had fallen to less than one third.
Conversely, the share of the five Congress-ruled provinces of Bihar, Bombay, the Central Provinces, Madras and the United Provinces rose from less than one third to more than two thirds of the total.37 Table 2 shows the changes in the location of disputes between I937 and I938. In most Congress-ruled provinces, the number of disputes and of workers involved in them did not actually increase between I937 and 1938, but the number of man-days lost multiplied spectacularly, an indication that strikes lasted longer. In 1938, half of the disputes ended in a settlement which was at least partly satisfactory for the workers.38 Among causes of disputes, wage demands came first, but significantly, demands for the recognition of trade unions were on the increase.39 This reflected the spectacular growth of the trade-union movement in I937-38. The number of registered unions and their membership increased by fifty per cent in one year, an unprecedented fact in the 37 Computed on the basis of Table 2. 38 Out of 387 disputes in which settlements were arrived at during the year, in 18I or 46.77%, the workers were successful in gaining concessions. In 51 or 13. 18%, they were completely successful and in 130 In the Congress-ruled provinces, Indian capital was generally dominant, and therefore bore the brunt of the labour unrest. In Madras and the United Provinces, where British-controlled mills employed approximately half of the workforce in the cotton textile industry,42 the strikes tended to affect the Indian capitalists as much or even more than their British colleagues. In Madras, most of the strikes took place in or around Coimbatore where there were few British mills. In the United Provinces, the Cawnpore strikes hit both the Indian and British millowners. The nationality of the owners made visibly little difference to the striking workers.
Turning now to the policy of the Congress ministries in labour matters, their dilemma is nicely, though somewhat naively, summed up by a labour historian, who writes:
The [Congress] organization as a whole did not desire to alienate the vested interests. It was keen on retaining their friendship and cooperation. The Congress ministries were, therefore, faced with a difficult task; they had to do something to satisfy workers' demands but they had to see at the same time that employers did not get too angry or annoyed.43
Actually the Congress High Command was very conscious of the predicament in which the ministries found themselves, but it decided that, to avoid a bigger explosion on the labour front, concessions had to be made quickly to the workers. In October 1937 the Congress Labour Committee, after holding consultations with the labour ministers from the Congress-ruled provinces, passed a series of resolutions44 aiming at the implementation of the programme of labour welfare chalked out in the Congress election manifesto. Yet the committee took care not to fix any time-limit for the implementation of these measures and left each 40 The number of registered unions increased from 262 in 1937, of which 219 submitting returns had a membership of 257,308, to 420 in 1938, of which 343 submitting returns had a membership of 390,11 2. Ibid., p. 234. The Congress provincial ministries responded by s committees to look into the question of wages in th Such committees were formed in Bombay, the C the United Provinces. They were non-official bodies tatives of capital and labour sat beside political wor These committees were subjected to contradictory p unions and from the employers' associations. Th mended wage increases which, though substanti more than a partial compensation for the wage cu depression. Their recommendations could be desc and in accepting them, the Congress governments s they were committed to trying to better the lot of t no desire to hit capitalist interests too hard. In the c enquiry committee appointed by the Congress gove mended the recognition of the union, the Mazd employers. The insistence in Cawnpore on the recog was no doubt due to the fact that it was controlled b who were close to the ministry.45 Elsewhere the que of the unions was left in abeyance, pending the est legislation on trade disputes, which some governm plating for the near future. On the whole, the C showed commendable moderation in dealing wit capitalists. In spite of it, they could not avoid an interests.
Apart from the labour policy, the economic followed by the Congress ministries during their first m office had also a direct impact upon their rel capitalists. These policies were generally characteriz bordering on conservatism. The new Congress minis duced any change in the budgets prepared by th ments which had assumed office during the few mon bickerings prior to the final acceptance of office by boldest step taken by some of the ministries was the loans which were very successful with the public.46
The only exceptions to this cautious policy w measures taken by the Bihar and United Provinces governments to so the overproduction crisis in the sugar industry of those two province Firstly, ajoint sugarcane conference, in which the representatives of th growers, manufacturers and traders took part, was convened by the tw governments in Lucknow at the end of September.47 Following it and after various consultations with the interests directly concerned, t Government of Bihar passed in the Assembly a sugar factories contro bill, which was soon followed by a similar bill passed by the Unit Provinces Assembly. Those bills aimed at regulating the supply of can to the mills, in a way which would ensure remunerative prices for th cultivators and check overproduction. The Congress governments Bihar and the United Provinces wanted basically to satisfy their rural clientele, especially the middle peasantry which had taken to sugarcan cultivation on a big scale, but they also wanted to conciliate t manufacturers who were a powerful lobby, especially since they h formed in I937 a combine called the sugar syndicate. Therefore th introduced in their bills a clause which forced all sugar mills to join t syndicate.48 This particular clause was irksome to some sugar mil owners who had stayed away from the syndicate49 but it helped ensure a high degree of coordination among the producers. The b proved beneficial to the sugar industry of Bihar and the Unit Provinces as well as to the growers. The only victim was the consume who had to pay a higher price for his sugar. In the case of the sug industry, the Congress governments acted as mediators between t groups, the growers and the manufacturers, whose interests were easy conciliate, but who had found it difficult to come to a direct agreemen In other provinces, initial measures in favour of Indian industr With a view to encourage the production of handloom cloth, the Madras Sale of Cloth Act was enacted and the Khadi (Name Protection) Act was extended to the Province'. Rs 2 lakhs were set apart for khadi production in each budget, and grants were given to the All-India Spinners Association. strike had been going on in Cawnpore for several weeks. After initial hesitation, the new ministry decided to ask the millown make one major concession to the workers by recognizing the Maz Sabha. The capitalists, both British and Indian, who had forme Employers' Association of Northern India to defend their inte against labour,62 were most reluctant to accord recognition as alleged that the Mazdoor Sabha was not a genuine union, but a poli organization preaching the overthrow of the capitalist system. tually they were forced to give in to Government pressure, bu resented it considerably.63 In fact, they never forgave the U Provinces Congress government for having sided with the worker few years later in the course of a private conversation SirJ. P. Sriv revealed that the Indian industrialists of Cawnpore, all Hindu, bec thereafter such bitter opponents of the Congress ministry that they to the length of subsidizing the Muslim League in the provin Another result of the strike was the appointment of the Cawn 62 See Pandey, As Labour Organizes, pp. 54 ff. 63 In a communique, the employers said that they felt 'that they should not hav forced by government to recognize the Mazdoor Sabha as long as it remains con as at present'. The Pioneer, I2 August I937. Labour Enquiry Committee to look into the question of wages in textile industry. While the committee was doing its work, the millown under the pretext of an incident in a mill, withdrew their recognition the Mazdoor Sabha.65 Therefore, when the committee submitted report in April 1938 recommending a twenty-one per cent increase in wages in the textile industry (it only .amounted to a restoration three-fifths of the wage cuts made during the depression), the situati was tense, and the rejection of the report by the Employers' Associat triggered off a new general strike which lasted almost two months. O again the question of the recognition of the Mazdoor Sabha became th main issue of contention between the two parties. During this sec strike, the Government, under pressure from the local Congres organization, gave some support, though half-hearted, to the strikers, and eventually the millowners had to give in again, though in the cour of their negotiations with the ministry they managed to make th recognition of the Sabha conditional upon changes in its intern constitution. The attitude of the Government came in for stron criticism even from Singhania, a Congress supporter,67 and in United Provinces relations between Indian business and the Congr remained tense.
In the United Provinces, the Indian capitalists took a very uncompromising line in their dealings with the industrial workers and resented the attempts at arbitration made by the Congress ministry, because they thought that the government's mind was biased in favour of labour. There are specific reasons for the failure of the Congress and the capitalists to find an adjustment. One of the reasons was the weight of the British in the capitalist class of the United Provinces, and the close links between them and Indian capitalists. British capitalists had no reason to be particularly friendly to a Congress ministry, and their stand influenced their Indian colleagues. Another factor leading to confrontation was the strong position enjoyed by the Congress socialists and other leftist elements in the Congress provincial organization. These forces were able to pressurize the ministry into taking a stand in favour of the workers, thus further antagonizing the capitalists. Bombay that 'the prospect of serious labour trouble in the mills' had 'faded away',74 and could rightly ascribe the change in the labour situation to the advent of a Congress ministry, the price paid by the millowners for industrial peace was indeed heavy. The foreseeable increase in the production costs of Indian textiles reduced the chances of reaching an agreement with Lancashire over the question of the duties on British textiles, and thus the Indo-British trade negotiations, the final success of which had become dependent on a direct agreement between Indian and British textile manufacturers,75 were more or less doomed to failure.
In other Congress-ruled provinces, capitalists faced with similar labour unrest also made concessions on wages. This was the case in Coimbatore where, following a strike in the mills, the Madras government referred the problem to a court of enquiry whose rulings were accepted by both parties, and in the Central Provinces where an enquiry committee was set up on the Bombay model.
Thus in those Congress-ruled provinces which had a textile industry, the millowners were forced to make some concessions to labour in order to avoid more widespread trouble. Generally the Congress ministries took an attitude which, though only mildly sympathetic to labour, was enough to create suspicions among the capitalists that the Congress was becoming hostile to them. Actually it could be argued that by pressurizing the industrialists into giving in to moderate labour demands, the Congress saved them from a more dangerous confrontation. But most Indian capitalists were not farsighted enough to perceive this, and they tended to see only the immediate cost incurred by them from the policies of the Congress governments. There were also differences in the responses of the capitalists, which were directly linked to the state of their relations with the Congress organizations in their respective provinces. In that respect, the United Provinces and Bombay represented two extreme cases. In the United Provinces, relations between local big business and the Congress had Congress ministry took up the matter seriously and 'improve considerably Giri's initial draft. In September 1938 they submitted to the Provincial Legislature the Bombay Trade Disputes Act, which w the most complex and effective piece of legislation ever devised in Ind for the settlement of industrial disputes. Though a provision for compulsory arbitration initially introduced by the framers of the bill w deleted from the final version,85 the bill included a provision for compulsory delay which could extend to several months before a strik or a lock-out could begin, a measure which drew applauses from t Governor of Bombay himself.86 Introducing the bill in the Bomba Legislative Assembly, Kher made clear the intention of his governmen 'to promote legislation aiming at the prevention of strikes and lock-out as far as possible'.87 Though the bill was theoretically aimed as much a lock-outs as at strikes, it was nevertheless obvious that its framers wer above all interested in stopping strikes. In any case, as lock-outs we generally declared in retaliation for strikes, it could be assumed that i there were no more strikes the incidence of lock-outs would tend to b less. The intention of curbing strikes was openly avowed by the Chief Minister who, in his Assembly speech, condemned labour unrest in th strongest terms and proclaimed that 'his government stood for cla collaboration and not for class conflict'.88
Though the framers of the bill pretended to keep a balance between capital and labour, a detailed examination of its many clauses brings ou the fact that it was heavily weighted in favour of the capitalist side. Fo instance, though strikes and lock-outs were appa footing, only strikes were penalized and not lockillegal strikes, which was six months imprisonmen
There was also a complex clause regarding the unions about which Nehru who, surprisingly confidential note that 'on the whole the Act remarked that 'company unions' were 'definitely very great advantages over independent unions encouragement given in the bill to occupation that it would 'lead to the formation of numerous caste and community lines'. The bill met with strong opposition in the Legi trade unionists, Ambedkar's independent labo
League, but the government was in such a hurry did not even allow the formation of a Select Committee to look more closely into its merits. Eventually the Bill was passed on 5 November 1938 amidst angry scenes.91 The haste with which the government acted showed that they wanted to put the bill into effect as soon as possible in order to establish their control over the labour movement in
Bombay.
Yet the immediate effect of the passing of the bill was to provoke a general strike in the Bombay Presidency in protest against the 'Black Act', as well as demonstrations of solidarity in the other provinces. In Bombay city, the strike was joined by approximately half of the millhands, but it failed to gain much support in Ahmedabad and Sholapur.92 The determined way in which the police under the Congress Raj dealt with the strikers93 shocked the public,94 but it showed that the ministry was determined to curb labour unrest at any cost.
The firm stand taken by the government against the general st earned for it the approval of the Bombay capitalists, who had the initial reservations regarding some of the clauses of the bill.95 Th could now forget them and look forward to an improvement in t labour situation in the province. The turn in government labour policy was soon epitomized by its attitude to the Bombay seamen's strike December I 938. Not only did it refuse any kind of support to the strike but it even adopted harsh repressive measures against them.96 The fac that many seamen in Bombay were employed by Scindia, the big navigation company led by Walchand Hirachand who had links wit the ministry, might also partly account for the special callousne 96 See Karnik, Indian Trade Unions, pp. I 14-15. 97 In July 1939, the relations between the provincial trade union Congress and t provincial government reached the breaking-point, following a letter sent by t government to the Mazdoor Sabha, in which they had objected strongly to th preaching of class hatred by trade unions. The Leader, 14 July I939.
98 There were also encouraging signs in the econo provincial governments, although concrete adv businessmen from such policies remained necessaril Command increasingly tended to intervene on interests with the various provincial government Patel, in a circular addressed to all the Congress urged them to insure all government business w companies. He also asked them to put pressure on t and other protected industries to do the same. In 112 See the correspondence between Thakurdas, one of the unofficial advisers and Iyengar, Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Finance Department, in August I938. In a letter dated 18 August Thakurdas wrote: 'if the textile industry is to make the sacrifice indicated in the proposals [of the Board of Trade] under piece goods and prints, obviously they will not be able to stand any more burden which provincial governments in India may have in mind to put on them'. Copy in Kher Papers, II, File 3. In a letter dated 25 August, Iyengar replied that it was impossible for the ministers to commit themselves in advance on the final outcome of the labour enquiry committee and that they considered 'that the terms of the Indo-British pact must bejudged on the basis of the facts as they are today'. Copy enclosed in Irwin, Secretary to the Governor of Bombay, to Puckle, Secretary to the Viceroy, Linlithgow Papers, Vol. 52. amounted to Rs 0.4 crores. Therefore supplementary resources crores had to be found, of which approximately 1.3 crores were alr provided by the levy of various small taxes and duties, but th remained a balance of Rs 0.7 crores.113 Though the United Prov were a special case even a financially sound province like Bomba also looking for new sources of revenue.114 The Congress ministrie therefore no alternative but to increase taxation, however unpo such a move was bound to be. The only choice which they could ex was, which categories of the population would have to bear the bur of the increase. Though Bihar and Assam, two almost exclusiv agricultural provinces, tried to introduce an agricultural incom Congress ministries in other provinces sought to avoid taking such which would create opposition to the Party in the countryside, espe among the landholding classes which were the main power base of Congress regimes. Therefore they decided to shift the main bu towards the less inflammable and less strategic urban areas.
The possibilities of levying new taxes were severely limited b constitution, which reserved the levy of income tax of any kind t Central Government. The United Provinces government tried t around the difficulty by introducing an employments tax, which w indirect way of taxing the incomes of merchants and employe labour. Not surprisingly their proposal met with determined oppos from the trading and industrial interests of the province. Afte employments tax bill had been passed by the Assembly on 6 April a protest conference was convened, in which prominent busines participated.1l5 A few days later a memorandum was sent to Viceroy by seven associations representing the bulk of commercial industrial capital in the province, underlining that the tax was ultra of a provincial government, and asking the Viceroy to refer the ca the newly-established Federal Court.1l6 The last months of Con rule in the United provinces saw the local business class put up a st fight against the financial policy of the Congress ministry.
In other Congress-ruled provinces the ministries generally follow of labour was lower than in the Bombay Presidency. They were more successful in their fight against the proposal for the fixation of a minimum wage, which the Textile Labour Enquiry Committee, still working on its final report, was known to be contemplating. In August I939, Gulzarilal Nanda, Parliamentary
Secretary to the Government of Bombay, and the real power in matters of labour policy, hinted, while the committee were still sitting, that in view of the difficult situation in the textile industry, the government would oppose any move tending to put up wages. 129 With the worsening of the situation in September I939, the millowners sought more radical measures. Thus the Ahmedabad millowners obtained the agreement from Patel to a twenty per cent cut in wages, to be implemented after discussions with the unions.130 Yet the same Patel restrained the Bombay Government f twenty per cent increase in the price of cloth, as industry.13' Therefore just on the eve of the war, wh the crisis, the situation in the textile industry of the was so chaotic that it tended to affect adversely the r largest group of capitalists in the province and the C Apart from the United Provinces and Bombay, oth witnessed a deterioration in the relations between Indian business and the Congress. In Madras, where there was tremendous opposition to the sales tax proposal from the merchant community, a new provincial loan met with little success, a fact which the Governor of the province attributed to the hostility of capitalist interests to the Congress led to a further deterioration in relations between Congress and business in the provinces, which in its turn would have endangered the emerging alliance between Congress and Indian big business, as symbolized by their collaboration in the National Planning Committee. The interest of both the capitalists and the Congress, therefore, required an end to this uneasy situation. This explains why the capitalists took with equanimity the news of the resignation of the Congress ministries under the pretext of Linlithgow's rash move in committing India to the war without prior consultation with the Assembly. While they had nothing to gain from a continuation of Congress rule in the provinces, the prospect of easy war profits became alluring. It was once again important to establish good relations with the British authorities, and a large section of the Indian business class set to the task. The Congress ministries went down unsung and unregretted. Yet with the benefit of hindsight, we can see that the 1937-39 period was decisive in placing th relations between the Congress and business on a more assured footing.
It is worthwhile attempting a detailed assessment of it.
Conclusion
The advent of the Congress governments in most of the prov India did not result in major changes in economic and fiscal p which were basic to the prosperity of Indian capitalists, since con finances and customs remained in British hands. The impact of t governments was felt mainly in the realm of labour and ag relations, two domains in which provincial governments had pow legislate. It was also felt, though to a lesser extent, in the f industrial policy. Large sections of the Indian capitalist class rem unaffected by the direct impact of the Congress ministries businessmen who were engaged mainly in foreign trade, also tho had the bulk of their interests in the non-Congress provinces and Indian States (including a large section of the Marwari communit largest of the Indian business communities) did not suffer or gai result of the policies of the Congress. Given those limitations, the under review saw significant developments which had a l influence on the relations between Indian business and the Congr The most important result of the period of provincial autonomy definite shift in the labour policies and ideology of the Congress in the previous period, starting with the Karachi declarat fundamental rights, Congress had tended to be vaguely sympathe workers' demands but had not been deeply invo movement (with the exception of Ahmedabad), suddenly confronted with an unprecedented w sweeping the entire country. Congress response largely shaped by the fact that it had already estab with the capitalists and could ill afford to upset it, of a new struggle with the British, it would again from the businessmen. Though the Congress gover concessions to the workers, they mainly aimed a movement within definite bounds. To achieve this, drawn into intervening more actively in the af movement. There they clashed with other organ larly with the communists, who were not very stro influence mainly in Bombay and Cawnpore. A confrontation, the Congress labour policy became d of communist infiltration, which drove them towar of greater moderation. For the Congress, labour po synonymous with labour administration; struggles cessary and dangerous and direct peaceful dialogue and workers was favoured as the only solution t Bombay Trades Disputes Act expressed the esse philosophy of labour relations: conciliation was costs. Though this approach tended to work to t capitalists, it could also clash with their interests, sin themselves sought confrontation and were prevent Yet the Congress blueprint for industrial relations to favour capitalist interests, and the Indian busine to 1937 had harboured fears that the Congress w control labour, could feel reassured that a Congr effective as the British Raj, if not more so, in dealin class.
In other fields also the policies pursued by the Congress ministries helped to dispel fears entertained by the capitalists. For instance, widespread apprehensions about nationalization of public services and key industries were set at rest by the policy of collaboration with private enterprises pursued in the Congress-ruled provinces.
The question of capitalist attitudes to the policy of rural upliftment followed by the Congress ministries is, however, more complex. Rajat Ray has argued that this policy was basically in the interest of the capitalists, since it ultimately aimed, by raising the standard of living in the countryside, at enlarging the internal market for industrial goods.135 Yet, apart from the fact that it could be seen as a divers scarce resources which could have been utilized more efficientl giving direct aid to industrial development, another inherent dang this policy was underlined by the President of the United Prov Merchants' Chamber. He expressed fears that, if not supporte appropriate measures to relieve indebtedness, the rural upliftment d of the Congress governments might result only in an increase of s tension by raising expectations without being able to satisfy them Basically capitalists, though they might be interested in agricu development, had a stake in the preservation of the social status qu the countryside, and any attempt at disturbing it even mildly, as in United Provinces with the I939 Tenancy Bill, was looked upon suspicion. The enlargement of the internal market was a secon consideration compared to social peace. Yet the emergence of a wea tenantry in some regions like Gujerat was a welcome developm provided this group did not compete too directly with urban capit for governmental resources. In any case further research int problem of rural-urban linkages, a neglected field, is needed befor can form a clearer picture of the situation.
As far as the related question of large versus small-scale and cott industries is concerned, things are not very clear either. Though it c rightly argued that there was no fundamental opposition of intere between the cotton mills and the handlooms (since the latter largely fed with yarn from the mills), it should yet be noticed th Bombay, the millowners resisted attempts by the provincial ministr allot production quotas to the mills and the handlooms, and to rese share of the market to cottage production. 137 By the end of the 1930s despite the setting up of the National Plan Committee, the options of the Congress in matters of economic po were far from clear and priorities had not been sorted out. Questi relations between agriculture and industry, large and small-s industries, the place of foreign capital, were still unresolved. Cong economic thought was still in a state of flux, with 'Gandhian socialists battling about modern industrialization, and it took a more years before a clearer picture started to emerge.
Within a general framework marked by a growing trend of mod 
